13 Νοεμβρίου 2014

The Art of Roy Ascott

Filed under: ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ — admin @ 09:30

Gary Michael Dault

The Art of Roy Ascott

artscanada #166/167/168, Spring 1972.
[ 1,395 words ]

In February, the University of Guelph mounted the first show in Canada of the work of Roy Ascott, comprising pieces from 1960 to the present. I should like to point out some of the qualities and concerns of Ascott’s art by concentrating on three areas of work: the Video Roget of 1962, the templates and chance-maps of 1967-70, and the current ‘transactional’ pieces.

The Video Roget, featured in his one-man show at London’s Molton Gallery (1963) is perhaps the outstanding result to that date of the artist’s dissatisfaction with the static one-to-one spectator / artifact relationship and his attempt during these years to provide himself and his audience with a machine for wide ambiguous experience and more particularly for the infinitely suggestive cross-referencing that occurs between shape and mind. Acting as a visual thesaurus, the Video Roget presented alternatives and near-equivalences of relationship, this time in terms of shape instead of word-meaning. The piece consisted of four horizontal rows of archetypal or at least highly generalized shapes (flap, wedge, bottle-container, claw, umbrella-shelter, etc.) separated (two rows, above and below) by a horizontal black (unknowable) area referred to as a ‘calibration unit’, a linking device between rows of shapes, a ‘black box’ which suggested that it housed the spectator’s reaction space and the process of the mind’s construction of meaningful relationship between the shapes. The piece presented not only an opportunity for personalized, participatory image-making by the viewer but also offered itself as a simplified demonstration of the working of any analogue structure: the essence of metaphor that this is possibly equivalent to that, run through the switchboard of Mind, equivalences between them close enough and suggestive enough to alter and enhance simultaneously both original ideas.

The long series of templates and chance-maps had to do with the artist’s concentration upon the ideas of boundaries and parameters. For Parameter III (1967), Ascott set out to investigate some of the ways in which boundaries are decided upon, to see how spatial limits are chosen and fixed, and to find out what it is a parameter really does, what it means. With Parameter III, he worked on wood, on a sheet of wood larger than the diamond-shape he had previously decided upon and measured out as the controlling outside shape and size of the piece. Then, acting on the wood surface both inside and outside of this chosen area, he drew, scribbled, and otherwise despoiled the surface in random ways, cutting away certain areas of wood where his resulting lines suggested that cuts be made (often finding in the process that certain cuts caused such a weakening in particular parts of the sheet that whole areas of it would crumble away) and then building up on the surface that remained (survived, actually) coat upon coat of polymer wash, thus effectively toning down and eventually blocking out almost entirely any information about how the final shape came to be, how its edge was chosen. The end result is a large irregular shape of wood now sufficiently containing itself, its perimeter the wandering high-pressure outline holding it all together, the piece now at rest in a kind of final blandness (though with the apparent peacefulness of its surface belied by the distant recollection of the struggle of its making demonstrated by the writhing of its outer edge). More recent variations upon this work, Chance-map (Red) (1970), for example, allow the spectator to see the gyrations and criss-crossings of crayon lines on the surface of the wood, this drawing being the chaotic undifferentiated activity upon which the artist’s decisions about, for example, cutting the wood, have been made; in this particular work, some areas formed by the crossing of lines have been darkened by staining, some other such areas cut out those areas, according to the artist, that were ‘almost looking like something but not quite’ those areas where generalized, almost significant images came swimming up through the chaos; the piece in this respect acts as a primitive Video Roget. In this case, however, only a couple of steps backwards from it, the piece becomes a large coloured wooden panel, something only in the process of becoming a display-case of generalized universal images.

One of the terms Ascott has coined to help explain the meaning of his work is the word ‘metaform’. Obviously deriveable from ‘metaphor’, a metaform is a form (flat shape or three-dimensional object) ‘greater than the particular’, abstracted from it (the ‘idea’ of a wave-form, for example, or perhaps a spiral or perhaps a tube); so are the generalized shapes of the Video Rogetmetaforms. But in addition to its appearance as a generalized physical form, a metaform has, the artist feels, audience-reactive, behavioural, performance qualities as well. That is to say, it may be introduced with measurable effect, for example, into an otherwise inert ‘situation’. Ascott talks of his interest in setting up certain physical and possibly banal situations like ‘wardrobe’ or ‘supermarket’ or ‘bathtub’ and introducing into this kind of benign everyday theatre a particular metaform or assortment of metaforms, which upon contact will then animate themselves and their contexts together, charging both with new meanings. In just such a way, for example, does Marshall McLuhan’s DEW-line card pack work as a programmer of hitherto unexpected approaches to a problem. In one method for use of the pack, the problem-solver is dealt three cards, each of which is printed with an aphorism or a pun or an otherwise suggestive statement. The object of the thing is to force a new look at a previously unsolvable problem by bringing to bear upon it a new meaning for it, the result of the energetic juxtaposition of the three previously unrelated ideas forced into confrontation and focused on the neutral problem. If, in Ascott’s work, we see the neutral physical situation of say ‘bathtub’ as the ‘problem’ we are attempting to animate, then we bring to that situation not aphorisms or puns but Ascott’s metaforms’, concrete visual objects (visual ideas) capable, like McLuhan’s aphorisms, of wide energetic interpretation. Just as the introduction of potent idea into neutral problem further animates both idea andproblem in the ensuing dialogue, so the introduction of the metaforms into the neutral physical situation energizes and renders significant both metaform and original situation in a new total way.

In the current ‘transactional’ pieces, the artist has provided a variety of physical situations, a counter top, a metal ladder, some tables, and a selection of metaforms, in this case ‘found’ ones, things easily available in hardware stores, certain already abstracted things (a plastic funnel, for example, a pure idea made visible); furthermore, he has not only brought these units together for their mutually animating effect, but has added the possibility of spectator participation (thus their ‘transactional’ potential) as the ‘players’ rearrange the objects in ways that they themselves determine. Unlike classical ‘found objects’ (Duchamp’s, for example, had to do with criticism) these readymades of Ascott’s are quite literally visual ideas; they act as tools in the transactions which occur when they are manipulated. As Ascott points out, one of his table-tops loaded with arrangeable objects is not so much itself a proposition (except for the mutually animating one we have discussed) as it is the raw material with which a proposition can be made. The transactional process of two people pulling up chairs, sitting down and arranging generalized, familiar, but strangely evocative objects in new and surprising ways, this game-playing is of course an analogue for the way things get themselves discovered in science, in art, and in administration of all kinds; indeed, the process of playing with these things is a useful analogue for the contemporary administrative process. Appropriately enough, Ascott is administrator as well as artist, in this case President of the Ontario College of Art; I should be tempted to refer to his current work as an artist as ‘theoretical administration’; certainly the aesthetics of the things he makes and the meaning of the things he says and does are all of a piece. Ascott’s metaform for open-ended art education has, as is common knowledge, pretty well polarized the College. It has done so in very much the same way as a concrete visual metaform energizes the hitherto benign theatre into which it is introduced.

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The connectivist turn.

Filed under: ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ — admin @ 09:29

The connectivist turn. Roy Ascott, Telematic Embrace. Visionary Theories of Art, Technology, and Consciousness.
		Author: Jan Baetens Published: May 2004 Roy Ascott, Telematic Embrace. Visionary Theories of Art, Technology, and Consciousness. Edited and with an essay by Edward A. Shanken Berkeley, California University Press, 2003


		If the definition of a good book is that one feels intellectually provoked during its reading, and leaves the volume with the certitude of being more intelligent than at the start, then Telematic Embrace is the book one might be looking for. And if one is not hesitant about the old seductions of style and, most of all, that impossible thing called the ‘personality’ of its author, this book provides even more than one could ask from a vast collection of essays in the problematic, because too overtly fashionable and therefore too easily outfashioned, field of theory on art and electronic culture. In the case of Ascott’s writings, those two elements–the visionary force of his thinking on the one hand and the personal qualities of his style on the other–may seem a little contradictory, since few authors have made such strong pleas in favour of “distributed authorship” and against the mirages of the traditional (romantic, ego-centered) art world, yet the very example of Telematic Embrace, which presents an extremely useful, highly representative and carefully edited anthology of Ascott’s scholarly work, proves one of the basic theses of the author, i.e. that the leap towards global connectiveness through cybernetics and telematics does not exclude the human factor or prevent man from liberating himself when abandoning the traditional domains of the humanities. Most books and essays on the relationship between art, science, and technology, represent either a synthesis or a ‘snapshot’ of what their authors have been thinking or are thinking on the subject. In both cases, their writings are homogeneous: in the case of a book, the previous phases of reflection are integrated in a kind of global survey that camouflages internal contradictions and transforms previous hesitations and errors into stepping-stones on the long path leading to final insights; in the case of an essay, which normally gives just a cross-section of the author’s thinking on that specific point of time and place, the lack of a global framework is not always considered a flaw, and contradictions with later texts are part of the game (“This was what I was thinking in 1984, and this is what I am thinking now, and tomorrow I may appear to think something else…”). The exceptional merit of Roy Ascott’s work as a theoretician of the relationships between art, science, and technology, is that it in spite of their often shattered and overtly ‘visionary’ character, they are not just a succession of speculations in which new links replace or destroy the previous ones. Although they have not been rewritten for this publication, the texts gathered in Telematic Embrace span a period of more than three decades (1964-1993) and reveal indeed an exceptional coherence (and maybe even a kind of master narrative, yet this word may be too negatively connoted). This coherence is not the result of the mere application of a pre-established, teleological programme or of a single, all-explaining and stubbornly adhered to theoretical paradigm. The coherence of Ascott’s thinking and writing develops almost spontaneously along some basic lines, which the author never renounces but which he always adopts following his own principles of feed-back and interactivity. If one had to summarize Ascott’s evolution, one might say that he gradually moved from cybernetics to telematics, and from telematics to an overall view of connectedness at both an electronic and at a biological level. In the late 50s and during the 60s, Ascott pioneered the interaction of art and the emerging science of cybernetics (defined as “the study of control and communication in living and artificial systems”, p. 331). He then realized, with the cyberneticians themselves, that such a study missed an essential point, namely the fact that the observer had to be considered part of the system studied. This brought him to second-order cybernetics, which recognized the blurring of boundaries between object and observer, while emphasizing even more the importance of feed-back and interactivity. With the revolution of telematics (the integration of computers and telecommunications), Ascott’s ideas evolved towards a what he calls “connectivism”, a paradigm in which the ancients spheres of mind, body, and world, or those of nature and culture, are no longer separable and in which universal interaction is celebrated as a new step in evolution (not only of man’s evolution, since there is no longer a clear-cut separation of man and non-man in the universe). All of this sounds familiar and the name of McLuhan comes quickly to mind. The philosophical underpinnings of Ascott’s telematic embrace and McLuhan’s global village are not without analogy: the East and the West will meet, human conflicts will be overcome by ‘communication’, ancient hierarchies will be replaced by freedom and democracy, even love will be in the air. Ascott likes quoting (and connecting!), for instance, more or less like-minded people such as the 19-th French socialist thinker Fourier, the apologist of “universal attraction”, the Jesuit Teilhard de Chardin, the inventor of the “noosphere”, or J.E.Lovelock, the advocate of Gaia, not to speak of McLuhan himself, regularly mentioned with great sympathy. Yet there are also considerable differences, which undoubtedly play in favour of Ascott. Ascott’s visionary thinking is always deeply rooted in concrete, professional contexts: his many appointments (academic, advisory, and editorial) all over the world have insured that he has always been in very close contact with the wishes and the needs of students, artists, researchers, and the interested audience. This field experience is crucial: it is the perfect counterweight to intellectual freewheeling and gratuitous speculation (what Ascott is discussing is always both visionary and down to earth: in the same essay, for instance, he can demonstrate the necessity to establish ‘post-institutional’ ways of working and giving all possible details on the equipment of each single room of the Ars Electronica Center in Linz). It is also the warrant of a real interdisciplinary approach (Ascott’s understanding of contemporary science, for instance, is a real understanding, and not that of a dilettante (?)). Moreover, Ascott’s work has always been at the service of the intellectual needs of the field. The selection of his essays in Telematic Embrace gives full and clear evidence of this attitude of deep concern with the didactics of contemporary art (of course, since ‘everything is connected’, these didactics are never bookish). Almost all important issues which are at stake in the twentieth-century reflection on art, are represented here: the role and place of a museum, the relationship between art object and audience, the integration of art and society, etc. Ascott’s place in the philosophy of art (I know this label is erroneous, but nevertheless it helps to stress the importance of this work) is paradoxical. Ascott is antimodern, since he rejects absolutely the ideology of the purity of art and the celebration of its objects, and in this respect his visionary thinking can be linked with post-structuralism (one is not surprised to see that in the recent texts by Ascott the name of Deleuze starts appearing). Yet at the same time, his clear belief in some Grand Narrative makes him a antipostmodernist (many essays, even in the years when postmodernism was still a positive value, are very critical of its incapacity to tackle the new and to exceed the parodying relationship with the past). The very long introductory essay by Edward A. Shanken, who did a wonderful job as an editor (the very fact that the editing goes almost unseen is the best compliment one can address to an editor!), provides the reader with a very profitable historical survey of the major tendencies in 20 th century art one has to know in order to fully understand what is at stake in Ascott’s work. It is at the same time a perfect introduction to this work itself, which it helps to interpret while giving the reader a strong impulse to deepen their own interpretations. Often, collected and introduced essays are broken up into two non-communicating parts: the new introduction and the older essays. In Telematic Embrace, the editor and the author manage to make love.

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Turning on Technology

Filed under: ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ — admin @ 09:29

Turning on Technology
by Roy Ascott

Art’s affair with technology has led to more than a marriage of materiality, and more than the augmentation of intelligence that high-speed computing power and ubiquitous networks bring to the human condition. The significant outcomes are as much spiritual as biological or social. In this reconfiguration of ourselves and our culture, the process of transformation lies between what I call cyberception,¹ technologically extended cognition and perception, and the technoetic aesthetic,² art allied to the technology of consciousness. As for the social impact of new media, it is well over thirty years since McLuhan pointed out that “we are…suddenly nomadic gatherers of knowledge, nomadic as never before, informed as never before, free from fragmented specialism as never before–but also involved in the total social process as never before.”³
Nowadays, we are more likely to describe this as the telemadic navigation of hypermedia and the net, but the point remains: we are engaged in a new social process. This in turn flows from the new thinking that circulates in, around, and as a consequence of the convergence of computers, communications, and biotechnologies, which is leading to the reinvention of the self, the transformation of the body, and the noetic extension of mind. In the process, art has shifted its concern from the behavior of forms to forms of behavior. While artists engage optimistically with this shift, some are not uncritical. Speaking of our bionic ambitions for the body, for example, Michael Joo feels that “our demand…for hyperextensions of our physical selves…is tragically ironic.”⁴ Critical and poetic responses can co-exist, and multimedia can be “structured around extremes–extreme behavior, irrational actions, or illogical technology” (Susan Otto). There is no doubting the sensitivity, vitality, and invention that informs the highly diversified field of technology-based art.
Of course there are exceptions. When art is no more than craft, when the artist engages in little more than exploring what a machine can do, the output can be banal. In fact, most early computer-based art took this route, a kind of digital extension of modernism. Not so in the case of Techno-Seduction. Here the conceptual base is substantial, and human values predominate. Questions of gender, race, power, identity, the body, and the environment are raised at interactive interfaces and within responsive installations that enrich the viewer’s transactions with significance and sensibility. Narrative structures are reexamined. All is under the sign of transformation and within the cannon of uncertainty: “identities are not fixed, but contingent and mutable” (Christine Tamblyn).
The rubric under which the exhibition is presented may imply that technology is inherently seductive, or that it is an instrument of seduction, drawing us into a less than human world without art or values. But I would argue that the reverse is true. We artists are trying to seduce the machine: we wish to embrace it with our ways of thinking and feeling. We want computers that emote, networks that are sentient, robots that care. We stroke their screens, play with their mice, run our fingers over their keyboards, to entice them into our field of consciousness. At the same time, powerful claims are presented for the emotional capacity of technology: “With a pulsed laser and the metaphysical medium of holography, I wanted to dig out of those bodies a taste of human passion and angst” (Harriet Casdin-Silver).
Ever since Rosenblatt’s Perceptron,⁵ with many false starts we have been trying to seduce the intelligent machine into a more human way of thinking. What are neural networks if not the measure of our determination to bring artificial learning and associative thought into line with our own cognitive processes? This principle of seduction is best exemplified in the technology of artificial life,⁶ whereby we invite technology into the living world. Can artificial consciousness be far behind?
Henri Bergson wrote: “Consciousness seems proportionate to the living being’s power of choice. It lights up the zone of potentialities that surround the act. It fills the interval between what is done and what might be done.”⁷ In short, it is the space of art. Bergson, properly admired for his affirmation of the Heraclitean flux and flow, lacked only the dynamics of our networked hypermedia to complete his model of mind. The cognitive rhythms, the jumps and leaps, the hyperlinks, tunneling from mind to mind, image to sound, sound to text, from real locations to virtual places, from people in the street to identities in cyberspace, these characterize the desires and ambitions of artists caught up in this techno-seductive dance of the mind.
Seven years ago, when I wrote “Is there Love in the Telematic Embrace?” for Art Journal,⁸ it was to identify attraction, affinity, love, or, as we say, “connectivity” as central to art’s concern and its augmentation by telematic media. I argued that the artist’s responsibility was now toward context rather than content, with meaning emerging from the interactions of the viewer and their necessarily unstable relationship. The principle of open-endedness and indeterminacy, extending to every part and player in the technoetic arts, is even more insistent today.
“Meaning, like the body and its culture, is fleeting, transitory, and has no center or hierarchy” (Jenny Marketou).
Just as intelligence is spreading everywhere, leaking out of our brains and spilling into our homes, our tools, our vehicles, so too is connectivity. We are about to see the environment as a whole come online–a global networking of places, products, ideas, with the Internet as a kind of hypercortex. Increasingly, artists like Jessica Irish seek to link their installations and electronic sculptures inextricably with the World Wide Web. While for Adrianne Wortzel cyberspace is where the present can be “archaeologically” excavated from a virtual place in the future.
With everything connected, everything can be shared, including, of course, responsibility. Poignantly, Duane Slick reminds us:
“Everything I see, everything I hear, I have become responsible for.”
As this exhibition demonstrates, art can be propositional and computational as much as visual or metaphorical. Janet Zweig speaks for a whole generation of artists when she claims to be “more interested in the possibilities of using the computer as a thinking device than as an imaging device.” It may at first appear strange to be told that the “game of images”⁹ is over. There never was a time when the image was so fecund, so insistent. But while it remains substantially visual, art is increasingly based in concepts, constituting in many ways a kind of philosophical process. It is more street smarts than grand narrative, attuned to what lies beneath the surface of things, questioning the why more than the what: “It is the unseen, interior structures of nature and thought that interest me” (Kathleen Ruiz). Melinda Montgomery enlists science-fiction to explore questions of mind-body identity.
In this technoetic culture, the art we produce is not simply a mirror of the world, nor is it an alibi for past events or present intensities. Engaging constructively with the technological environment, it sets creativity in motion, within the frame of indeterminacy, building new ideas, new forms, and new experience from the bottom up, with the artist relinquishing total control while fully immersed in the evolutive process. The viewer is complicit in this, interactively adding to the propositional force that the artwork carries. It is seduction in semantic space: Barthe’s juissance all over again.10 And it is a noetic enticement, an invitation to share in the consciousness of a new millennium, the triumphant seduction of technology by art, not the seduction of the artist by technology.

¹ See Roy Ascott, “The Architecture of Cyberception,” in M. Toy, ed., Architects in Cyberspace (London: Architectural Design, 1995), 38-41.
² “Noetic” is from the Greek nous, mind.
³ Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 358.
⁴ Unless otherwise cited, quotations from artists in the Techno-Seduction exhibition are from their artist’s statements.
⁵ See Frank Rosenblatt, Principles of Neurodynamics (New York: Spartan Books, 1962).
⁶ Artificial life is concerned with generating lifelike behavior, artificial intelligence with intelligent behavior. See Christopher G. Langton, ed., Artificial Life(New York: Addison-Wesley, 1989), 1-47.
⁷ Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Michell (New York: Holt, 1922), 179.
⁸ Roy Ascott, “Is There Love in the Telematic Embrace?” Art Journal 49, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 241-47. See also Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz, eds., Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 489-98.
⁹ The phrase belongs to Deleuze: “But a game of images never replaced the deeper game of concepts and philosophical thought for Nietzsche.” Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983), 31.
¹⁰ See Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Roland Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975).

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4 Νοεμβρίου 2014

για την περιπλάνηση σας στη πόλη

Filed under: UNCLASSIFIED 1,ΑΣΚΗΣΕΙΣ,ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ — admin @ 08:27

για την περιπλάνηση σας στη πόλη διαβάστε το υλικό από το σύνδεσμο
http://www.greekarchitects.gr/site_parts/doc_files/Psychogeography.pdf
http://www.cact.gr/uploads/files/eoflaneur-bill_psarras_teliko.pdf

Οι Καταστασιακοί και η Ψυχογεωγραφία στην Πολεοδομική αντίληψη

Posted on 19 Μαΐου, 2011 12:11 πμ από inflammatory

απο inflammatory

Το κείμενο είναι απο διάλεξη του Ewen Chardronnetστο φεστιβάλ “Τέχνη και Επικοινωνία: αρχιτεκτονική των μέσων” που πραγματοποιήθηκε το Μάϊο του 2003. Η μετάφραση του Μάνου Κορνελάκη και το blog όπου αλιεύτηκε, Reconstruction

Το τέλος της δεκαετίας του ’50 και αρχές ’60 ήταν μια περίοδος επιτάχυνσης της αστικοποίησης των Ευρωπαϊκών και άλλων πόλεων. Στο Παρίσι, έχουμε αυτή την εποχή ένα φαινόμενο που οι πολιτικοί και οι πολεοδόμοι αποκάλεσαν “νέες πόλεις”. Το Παρίσι εξαπλωνόταν με εκρηκτικό τρόπο πέραν του “περιφερειακού” του δρόμου και δημιουργήθηκαν πόλεις όπως η Sarcelles που βασίστηκαν σε εντελώς νέα μοντέλα αστικοποίησης. Υπήρχε δε έντονα η αίσθηση ότι οι πόλεις έχαναν τις ανθρώπινες διαστάσεις τους.
Θα προσπαθήσω κατ’ αρχήν να δείξω πως η επιτάχυνση του εκμοντερνισμού της αστικής κοινωνίας επηρέασε τις τακτικές της Καταστασιακής Διεθνούς, που ως εμπροσθοφυλακή επικεντρωνόταν σε θέματα όπως η ομογενοποίηση της κοινωνίας μέσα από την αστικοποίηση, τα μαζικά μέσα επικοινωνίαςκαι η διχοτομία ανάμεσα στην εργασία και την αξιοποίηση του ελεύθερου χρόνου. Θα εστιάσω ειδικά στην Ενιαία Πολεοδομική αντίληψη (Unitary Urbanism) και τα τέσσερα χρόνια έντονης δραστηριότητας (’58-’61) που κορυφώνεται με την εγκατάλειψη αυτών των θεωριών. Κατόπιν, θα συζητήσουμε σημερινές πρωτοβουλίες που χρησιμοποιούν τακτικά μέσα στους δρόμους και πως αυτά συνδέονται με μια νέα άνθηση της ψυχογεωγραφίας και την ανάγκη διεκδίκησης του δημόσιου χώρου.

Η Καταστασιακή Διεθνής γεννήθηκε το 1957 από την Διεθνή Λετριστική, το Φαντασιακό Μπάουχαους και την Ψυχογεωγραφική Επιτροπή Λονδίνου, ορίζοντας καινούργια πεδία ενδιαφέροντος κι ένα επαναστατικό πρόγραμμα που επικεντρωνόταν στον “εκτοπισμό (της συμβατικής τέχνης) και την πραγμάτωση της τέχνης μέσα στη ζωή” και επίσης σε αυτό που ονόμαζαν “δόμηση καταστάσεων“. Όπως τόσες άλλες αβάν-γκαρντ, ήθελαν να πετύχουν μια άνθηση της δημιουργικότητας μέσα στην κοινωνία.

Ιδέες κλειδί για τη θεμελίωση της κίνησης της Καταστασιακής Διεθνούς ήταν η Ψυχογεωγραφία, οικατασκευασμένες Καταστάσεις και η Ενιαία αντίληψη περί Πολεοδομίας. Το 1958, στο πρώτο τεύχος του δελτίου που εκδόθηκε από την Καταστασιακή Διεθνή υπό την διεύθυνση του Guy Debord, δίδονται οι ακόλουθοι ορισμοί:

κατασκευασμένη κατάσταση
Στιγμή ζωής, δομημένη συγκεκριμένα και σκόπιμα από τη συλλογική οργάνωση ενός ενιαίου κλίματος, μαζί με ένα παιχνίδι γεγονότων.

ψυχογεωγραφία
Η μελέτη των εξειδικευμένων επιπτώσεων του γεωγραφικού περιβάλλοντος (είτε είναι συνειδητά οργανωμένο είτε όχι) επί των συναισθημάτων και της συμπεριφοράς των ατόμων.

ενιαία πολεοδομία
Η θεωρία της συνδυασμένης χρήσης τέχνης και τεχνικής, ως μέσα που συνεισφέρουν στην δόμηση ενός ενιαίου περιβάλλοντος διαβίωσης, σε δυναμική σχέση με πειράματα συμπεριφοράς. “

Αυτές οι θεμελιακές έννοιες αναπτύχθηκαν για μερικά χρόνια από τα ιδρυτικά μέλη όπως ήταν ο Jornκαι ο Debord και τις αναπαρήγαγε το περιοδικό των Γάλλων Λετριστών Potlatch. Θα σας διαβάσω ένα απόσπασμα από το κείμενο του Asger Jorn “Μορφή και Εικόνα” που δημοσιεύθηκε το 1954 στο Potlatch, τεύχος 15.

“Η αρχιτεκτονική είναι πάντα η απώτατη πραγμάτωση κάθε νοητικής και καλλιτεχνικής εξέλιξης. Η υλοποίηση ενός οικονομικού/κοινωνικού κεκτημένου. Η αρχιτεκτονική είναι η κορύφωση κάθε καλλιτεχνικής παραγωγής, γιατί προσδιορίζει τη σύνθεση μιας ατμόσφαιρας και παγιώνει τρόπους ζωής.” Ενα άλλο θεμελιακό κείμενο με τίτλο “Συνταγές για μια Νέα Πολεοδομία” γραμμένο το 1953 από τον Gilles Ivain, ψευδώνυμο του Ivan Chtcheglov, δημοσιεύθηκε το 1958 στο πρώτο τεύχος του περιοδικού της Καταστασιακής Διεθνούς. “Η αυριανή αρχιτεκτονική θα είναι ένα μέσο τροποποίησης των τρεχουσών αντιλήψεων περί χώρου και χρόνου. Ενα μέσο για την απόκτηση γνώσης κι ένα μέσο δράσης.”

“Εχουμε ήδη επισημάνει την ανάγκη δόμησης καταστάσεων ως μια θεμελιώδη επιθυμία που θα αποτελέσει την βάση ενός επερχόμενου πολιτισμού. Η ανάγκη της απόλυτης δημιουργίας συνδεόταν πάντοτε βαθιά με την ανάγκη για παιγνιώδη εμπλοκή με την αρχιτεκτονική, τον χρόνο, το χώρο.” Οι περισσότεροι από όσους συμμετείχαν στην ίδρυση της ΚΔ (καταστασιακής διεθνούς) είχαν ήδη αποκλειστεί όταν εκδόθηκε το πρώτο συγκεντρωτικό δελτίο με τις θέσεις τους. Οι Olmo, Verrone και Simondo εκδιώχθηκαν μετά από σύγκρουση σε σχέση με κάποιο κείμενο για την Πειραματική Μουσική, που ο Debord χαρακτήρισε ‘δεξιάς πολιτικής σύλληψης’. Ο Rumney που δημιούργησε την Ψυχογεωγραφική Επιτροπή Λονδίνου κατά την ανακοίνωση ίδρυσης της ΚΔ, εκδιώχθηκε λίγο μετά επειδή θεωρήθηκε πως είχε αποτύχει να συντάξει έγκαιρα μια ψυχογεωγραφική αναφορά στη Βενετία. Η ειρωνία είναι πως είχε προλάβει να ταχυδρομήσει το δοκίμιό του δυο μέρες πριν πληροφορηθεί τι είχαν αποφασίσει στο Παρίσι.

Τον Δεκέμβριο του 1958, οι Constant και Debord έγραψαν την Διακήρυξη του Αμστερνταμ για να ετοιμάσουν την τρίτη σύνοδο της ΚΔ και η οποία δημοσιεύθηκε στο δεύτερο επίσημο δελτίο της κίνησης. Σε αυτό το τεύχος περιέχεται και η διάσημη “θεωρία της περιπλάνησης/dérive“. Σας διαβάζω μερικά αποσπάσματα από το μανιφέστο που αφορούν στην Ενιαία Πολεοδομία.

“4. Το ελάχιστο πρόγραμμα της Καταστασιακής Διεθνούς μπορεί να συνοψιστεί στην ανάπτυξη συνολικών σκηνογραφιών, που θα επεκτείνονται στην κατεύθυνση μιας ενιαίας πολεοδομίας και στην έρευνα νέων σχημάτων συμπεριφοράς σε σχέση με αυτά τα περιβάλλοντα.

6. Οι λύσεις για προβλήματα στέγασης, κίνησης και διάθεσης του ελεύθερου χρόνου, μπορούν να προκύψουν μόνο σε σχέση με κοινωνικές, ψυχολογικές και καλλιτεχνικές προοπτικές που θα συνδυαστούν ώστε να προκύψει μια σύνθετη υποθετική πρόταση στο επίπεδο της καθημερινότητας.

9. Μπορούν να χρησιμοποιηθούν όλα τα μέσα, αρκεί να εξυπηρετούν μιαν ενιαία δράση. Ο συντονισμός των καλλιτεχνικών και των επιστημονικών μέσων πρέπει να οδηγεί στην πλήρη συγχώνευσή τους.”

Η Γερμανική ομάδα Spur, την οποία ο Jorn συνάντησε το 1958, προσχώρησε στην ΚΔ κι έγινε το Γερμανικό τμήμα της. Μαζί με τον Constant -πρώην COBRA (πειραματική ομάδα, CΟpenhagen / BRussels / Amsterdam), η ομάδα αυτή επεξεργάστηκε δυο κεντρικές έννοιες του καταστασιακού προγράμματος, τις έννοιες του παιχνιδιού και της ηδονής.
Στο Άμστερνταμ δημιουργήθηκε το Γραφείο Ενιαίας Πολεοδομίας υπό την εποπτεία του Constant και κυρίως με τη συμμετοχή του Ολλανδικού τμήματος της διεθνούς. Στη σύνθεσή του περιλάμβανε μια ομάδα καλλιτεχνών, αρχιτέκτονες και κοινωνιολόγους, οι δε έρευνές τους κινήθηκαν στην κατεύθυνση κατασκευής σκηνογραφιών/καταστάσεων με ενιαία ατμόσφαιρα.

Η ιδέα των καταστασιακών περί ψυχογεωγραφίας (κάτι που σχετίζεται και με τα πειράματα του Constant από το ’53) ήταν πως στην πόλη μπορούσε κανείς να δημιουργήσει νέες καταστάσεις, συνδέοντας για παράδειγμα απομακρυσμένες γειτονιές. Το έκαναν αρχικά στο Αμστερνταμ, χρησιμοποιώντας walkie-talkie. Υπήρχε μια ομάδα που πήγε στο ένα μέρος της πόλης και μπορούσαν να επικοινωνήσουν με ανθρώπους που βρίσκονταν σε μια άλλη περιοχή.

Στο τρίτο τεύχος του δελτίου τους που δημοσιοποιήθηκε το 1959, το κομμάτι με τίτλο “Ενιαία Πολεοδομία στα τέλη της δεκαετίας του ’50” επιβεβαίωσε ότι η Ενιαία Πολεοδομία ήταν μια από τις προτεραιότητες της ΚΔ και ότι επίσης η ενιαία πολεοδομία δεν ήταν κάποιο σύστημα αστικής ανάπτυξης αλλά μιακριτική της αστικής ανάπτυξης. “Η Ενιαία Πολεοδομία αντιτίθεται στην ακινητοποίηση των πόλεων μέσα στο χρόνο και κηρύσσει τον διαρκή μετασχηματισμό τους, μια επιταχυνόμενη κίνησηεγκατάλειψης και ανοικοδόμησης της πόλης με όρους χρονικότητας, αλλά περιστασιακά και χωρικότητας. “Η Ενιαία Πολεοδομία αντιστρατεύεται και την δεσμευτική χωροθέτηση ή τακτοποίηση των ανθρώπων σε συγκεκριμένες αστικές περιοχές.”

Το δελτίο αναφέρεται και στην 3η σύνοδο της διεθνούς που έλαβε χώρα στο Μόναχο. Εκεί προέκυψαν αποκλίσεις ανάμεσα στον Debord και τον Constant ως προς την Ενιαία Πολεοδομία. Ο Debord επέμεινε πως επρόκειτο απλά για ένα εργαλείο και μίλησε για μια επαναστατική δημιουργικότητα πέρα από την υπαρκτή κουλτούρα. Ο Constant επέμεινε στον κεντρικό ρόλο της Ενιαίας Πολεοδομίας σαν εναλλακτικό μέσο απελευθερωμένης δημιουργίας και δεν έβλεπε σε αυτήν τις προϋποθέσεις για μια κοινωνική επανάσταση. Επεκτάθηκε μάλιστα στο κείμενο “μια άλλη πόλη για μια άλλη ζωή” σε περιγραφές ουτοπικών πόλεων και αρχιτεκτονικής. Η στάση του έμελλε να εισάγει διαχωριστικές γραμμές στους στόχους της ΚΔ.

Ενα χρόνο μετά την τρίτη σύνοδο, δεν είχε ακόμη λυθεί το πρόβλημα με την Ενιαία Πολεοδομία. Ο Constant παραιτήθηκε και το Γραφείο για την Ενιαία Πολεοδομία μεταφέρθηκε στις Βρυξέλλες υπό την διεύθυνση του Attila Kotányi. Στo κείμενo “Σφηγκοφωλιά συμμοριών και φιλοσοφία” (Gangland and philosophy) που δημοσιεύθηκε το 1960 στο τέταρτο τεύχος, ο Attila Kotányi ασκεί κριτική σε κάποιες πλευρές της Ενιαίας Πολεοδομίας και σε προσδιορισμούς του Debord καθώς και στο κείμενό του “Δόμηση Καταστάσεων“. Εντοπίζει αντιφάσεις στον Debord: “Η συνολική τέχνη που έχει συζητηθεί τόσο πολύ, μπορεί να πραγματοποιηθεί μόνο στο επίπεδο της αστικοποίησης”. Κατά τη γνώμη του αυτή ακριβώς ήταν και η περιοριστική συνθήκη της ΚΔ εκείνη την εποχή. Στην αργκό των συμμοριών του Σικάγο, gangland σήμαινε περιοχή εγκλήματος και διακίνησης παράνομου χρήματος. Ο Attila Kotányi προτείνει την επανεξέταση της καθιερωμένης γλώσσας και προπαγάνδας:

“Θα έπρεπε να αναπτύξουμε ένα μικρό γλωσσάρι αντεστραμμένων όρων. Προτείνω να λέμε συχνά Gangland/σφηγκοφωλιά συμμοριών αντί για “γειτονιά”. Να λέμε προστασία αντί για “κοινωνική οργάνωση”. Κοινωνία = βρώμικο χρήμα. Κουλτούρα = εθισμός. Διασκέδαση στον ελεύθερο χρόνο = νόμιμη εγκληματικότητα. Εκπαίδευση = προκατάληψη.

Η συστηματική νόθευση των βασικών πληροφοριών – για παράδειγμα από την εξιδανικευμένη αντίληψη του χώρου.. δεινή έκφραση της οποίας αποτελεί η συμβατική χαρτογραφία – είναι μια από τις κύριες εφεδρείες στην εκστρατεία του μεγάλου ψέμματος που τα εγκληματικά συμφέροντα επιβάλλουν σε όλη τη σφηγκοφωλιά του κοινωνικού χώρου. Αν μας επιτρεπόταν να καταγράψουμε μέσω συστηματικής έρευνας όλο τον κύκλο της κοινωνικής ζωής κάποιου συγκεκριμένου τομέα της πόλης για ένα σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα, θα αποκομίζαμε πιθανά μια ακριβή διατομική εικόνα του βομβαρδισμού πληροφοριών που υφίστανται οι σημερινοί αστικοί πληθυσμοί.”

Μετά το 1960 υπήρξε η μεγάλη κινητικότητα στην αστικοποίηση. Οι Κασταστασιακοί εγκατέλειψαν την θεωρία της Ενιαίας Πολεοδομίας, εφόσον αυτή είχε συγκεκριμένο νόημα μόνο στην περίπτωση ιστορικών πόλεων όπως το Αμστερνταμ. Από τη στιγμή που η κάθε ιστορική πόλη παρουσίαζε εκρηκτική ανάπτυξη στην περιφέρεια και τα προάστεια -όπως συνέβη στο Παρίσι κι ένα σωρό άλλα μέρη… το Λος Άντζελες, το Σικάγο, που άρχισαν να επεκτείνονται ανεξέλεγκτα- η θεωρία της Ενιαίας Πολεοδομίας έχασε το νόημά της. Ο Guy Debord είπε πως η αστική ανάπτυξη εξελισσόταν σε ιδεολογία και ότι οι άνθρωποι υπέκυπταν όλο και πιο πολύ στη γοητεία της. Ανάμεσα στην ιδέα για την επεξεργασία μιας θέσης για την αστική ανάπτυξη και τη θέση πως η αστική ανάπτυξη συνολικά είναι ιδεολογία, παρατηρούμε μια σημαντική μετατόπιση. Ακόμη και η dérive (η καταστασιακή περιπλάνηση), μαζί με τα σχετικά πειράματα, εγκαταλείφθηκαν περίπου εκείνη την εποχή.

Η σταδιακή ριζοσπαστικοποίηση του Γαλλικού τμήματος της διεθνούς οδήγησε βαθμιαία στη διαίρεση. Η κατάσταση φάνηκε να επιβαρύνεται με την παραίτηση του Jorn. Αποχώρησε τον Απρίλιο του 1961, ενώ η επιτυχία του στο εμπορικό καλλιτεχνικό στερέωμα ήταν τόσο μεγάλη που έκανε κατ’αναλογία τη θέση του στην ομάδα των καταστασιακών ιδιαίτερα άβολη.

Στο τεύχος 6, το θεωρητικό πρόβλημα της αστικής ανάπτυξης πήρε ακόμη πιο κεντρική θέση, παρά την σύγχρονη δημοσίευση ενός ειδικού δελτίου για την Ενιαία Πολεοδομία στο περιοδικό Spur. Ο νεοαφιχθείς στην Καταστασιακή Διεθνή Raoul Vaneigem ήταν μέλος του Γραφείου της Ενιαίας Πολεοδομίας μαζί με τον Attila Kotányi. Υπέγραψαν ένα “βασικό πρόγραμμα του Γραφείου της Ενιαίας Πολεοδομίας” αποκηρύσσοντας την Αστικοποίηση και το Θέαμα. Η ανάπτυξη του αστικού σκηνικού ήταν εν τέλει συνώνυμη με την τιθάσευση του χώρου από τον καπιταλισμό:
“Ο σύγχρονος καπιταλισμός που οργανώνει την υποβίβαση όλης της κοινωνικής ζωής στο επίπεδο του θεάματος, δεν είναι ικανός να παρουσιάσει άλλο πέραν του θεάματος της αλλοτρίωσής μας. Οι πόλεις που ονειρεύεται είναι το αριστούργημά του.“

Ο Vaneigem έπαιξε δύο τακτικούς ρόλους – θα έλεγα για να αποτελειώσει τη λεγόμενη Ενιαία Πολεοδομία – έναν μέσα στο Γραφείο της Ενιαίας Πολεοδομίας και ένα παρέα με τον Δανό Martin που σημάδεψε την απομάκρυνση από τις καλλιτεχνικές πρακτικές της ενιαίας αντίληψης περί αστικής ανάπτυξης. Στο ίδιο τεύχος του δελτίου γράφει τα “σχόλια κατά της αστικοποίησης” υποστηρίζοντας για παράδειγμα πως “η αστικοποίηση και η πληροφορία συνδέονται στις καπιταλιστικές και τις αντικαπιταλιστικές κοινωνίες: οργανώνουν τη σιωπή.”

Κατά την έναρξη της 5ης συνόδου που έγινε στο Γκέτενμπορ της Σουηδίας στα τέλη Αυγούστου 1961, ο Vaneigem ανακοίνωσε τα εξής: “δεν υπάρχει κάτι που να λέγεται καταστασιακή σχολή ή καταστασιακό έργο τέχνης.. πρόκειται για πιθανολογίες δίχως νόημα εφ’όσον δεν συνδέονται άμεσα με κάποιες επαναστατικές πρακτικές και με την θέληση η ζωή να αξιοποιείται διαφορετικά. […] Βρισκόμαστε ανάμεσα σε δυο κόσμους : έναν που δεν υπάρχει κι έναν που δεν αποδεχόμαστε.”

Η θέση της Γερμανικής ομάδας ‘Spur’ (που υποστηριζόταν από την πλειοψηφία των Σκανδιναβών) πάνω σε θέματα τέχνης κι επανάστασης ήταν αρκετά διαφορετική από του Vaneigem και των φίλων του. Οπως είχε φανεί και στην προηγούμενη γενική σύνοδο, η ομάδα αυτή πίστευε πως οι εργάτες δεν ήταν αρκετά δυσαρεστημένοι για να διαθέτουν το οποιοδήποτε επαναστατικό δυναμικό. Επίσης, διέφεραν και στο θέμα της “πραγμάτωσης της τέχνης δια του εκτοπισμού” που είχε αναπτύξει ο Ντεμπόρ. Η σύνοδος υιοθέτησε ένα ψήφισμα με εισήγηση του Attila Kotányi που πρότεινε να χαρακτηριστούν όλες οι καλλιτεχνικές δημιουργίες από μέλη της Καταστασιακής Διεθνούς ως έργα “αντι-καταστασιακά”. Ομως, η σύνοδος τελείωσε και παρέμειναν οι αντιφάσεις. Εξ μήνες αργότερα, ολόκληρο το Spur αποπέμφθηκε από την Κεντρική Επιτροπή. Τον Μάρτιο 1962, αποσχίστηκε η Σκανδιναβική ομάδα από την ΚΔ και ανακοίνωσε την ίδρυση μιας δεύτερης Καταστασιακής Διεθνούς γύρω από τον Nash (το νεότερο αδελφό του Jorn).

Με την επίθεση των Vaneigem και Martin ενάντια στους Νασιστές (τους υποστηρικτές του Nash) και τη ρήξη με τις θεμελιακές θεωρίες πάνω στην αστικοποίηση και την ψυχογεωγραφία, φτάνουμε τροποντινά και στο τέλος της Ενιαίας Πολεοδομίας και της Ψυχογεωγραφίας στο πλαίσιο της Καταστασιακής Διεθνούς. Συν τω χρόνω, εγκαταλείφθηκε και αυτή η θεωρία των καταστάσεων. Η περιοδική έκδοση έγινε πολιτικό όργανο. Εκτόξευαν δε προσβολές σε κάθε κατεύθυνση. Ο μόνος πρώην καταστασιακός που δεν εισέπραξε τα βέλη του Debord ήταν ο Jorn.

Το 1963, σε μια έκθεση στη Δανία, ο Martin παρουσίασε ένα έργο που το έλεγε “η καταστροφή των RSG 6“, παράλληλα με μια διαδήλωση ενάντια σε ένα πυρηνικό καταφύγιο στο Ενωμένο Βασίλειο. Στην έκθεση, ο Μάρτιν έδειξε θερμοπυρηνικούς χάρτες που απεικόνιζαν την Ευρώπη 4μιση ώρες μετά την έναρξη ενός τέτοιου πολέμου. Κάτι που φέρνει στο νου τις τακτικές του Γραφείου Μελετών..
Μερικούς μήνες μετά, ο Attila Kotányi αποκλείστηκε γιατί είχε ζητήσει τον ριζικό επαναπροσανατολισμό της θεωρίας. Αποπέμφθηκε με κατηγορίες για τάσεις προς τον μυστικισμό.

Εν είδει ανακεφαλαίωσης θα μπορούσα τώρα να πω την προσωπική μου γνώμη.

Νομίζω πως το 1961, η ριζοσπαστικοποίηση του Γαλλικού τμήματος και η ρήξη της Καταστασιακής Διεθνούς επήλθαν με άξονα την αίσθηση πως οι πρωταρχικοί στόχοι της Ψυχογεωγραφίας γλυστρούσαν προς μια σειρά ψυχογεωγραφικών “παιχνιδιών” και η ίδια είχε παύσει να είναι εργαλείο κοινωνικών κινημάτων. Κάτι που βλέπουμε και στις σημερινές τεχνολογικές εφαρμογές όπως GPS, κινητά τηλέφωνα, ασύρματα δίκτυα.. που παραμένουν πρακτικά στη σφαίρα της διασκέδασης αντί να χρησιμοποιούνται για κοινωνικές δράσεις. Η χρησιμοποίηση ενός συνδυασμού GPS και κινητής τηλεφωνίας για να εντοπίζεις τους φίλους σου στην πόλη, όπως προτείνει το Yahoo (και άλλες πλατφόρμες) σαν μια “φιλική” χρήση των τεχνολογιών αστυνόμευσης, είναι μια διφορούμενη πρακτική. Δεν μπορείς να γνωρίζεις αν τα στοιχεία σου είναι ασφαλή ή αν παρακολουθείται η λεγόμενη “φιλική” παρακολούθηση. Αντίθετα, θα ήταν καλή ιδέα να αναπτυχθούν πρωτότυπα νέα κινητά τηλέφωνα για εναλλακτική χρήση π.χ. σε πορείες διαμαρτυρίας.
Ηθελα επ’ευκαιρία να περιγράψω και το σύστημα “Acropol” που ανέπτυξε η εταιρία EADS, ένα νέο σύστημα ψηφιακού ραδιοφώνου που εισήχθη το 2001 για να αντικαταστήσει τους παλιούς ασυρμάτους UHF/VHF της αστυνομίας στο Παρίσι.
Πρόκειται για ένα σύστημα κόμβων μέσα στην πόλη, το οποίο όμως δεν ήταν τέλειο, δεν είχε σήμα σε υπόγεια περάσματα, παρ’όλ’αυτά όμως όλη η πόλη σύντομα θα είναι πλήρως εξοπλισμένη και το σύστημα είναι κρυπτογραφικό σε τέτοιο βαθμό που οι ακτιβιστές των ραδιοκυμάτων και οι κάθε είδους ριζοσπάστες δεν θα μπορούν να κρυφακούουν τις επικοινωνίες της αστυνομίας. Θα πρέπει λοιπόν να ψάξουν για νέες μεθόδους..

Οσον αφορά τις τακτικές για την οργάνωση μιας διαδήλωσης και την επιλογή της διαδρομής, είναι απαραίτητο να γνωρίζει κανείς πολύ καλά τις ψυχογεωγραφικές παραμέτρους της πόλης. Στο Παρίσι είναι αλλιώς να ξεκινάς τη διαδήλωσή σου από το Invalides (που παραθέτει στον θάνατο του Ναπολέοντα) με κατεύθυνση Saint Michel (περιοχή σύμβολο του ’68) ή να φύγεις από την Βαστίλλη (η πλατεία αυτή συμβολίζει την επανάσταση) για την πλατεία Nation (σύμβολο αντίστασης στους Γερμανούς επιδρομείς ανά τους αιώνες, καθώς βρίσκεται στα ανατολικά του Παρισιού όπου κατέφθαναν συνήθως οι εισβολείς σε όλους τους πολέμους). Υπάρχουν συγκεκριμένες επιλογές τοποθεσιών που εντασσόμενες σε μια διαδρομή διαμαρτυρίας θα μπορούσαν να ερεθίσουν τους διαδηλωτές μέχρι εκτροπής.
Νομίζω ακόμη πως η ψυχογεωγραφία είναι ένα εργαλείο για τη μελέτη του καπιταλισμού, τη μελέτη της ιστορίας, των σχέσεων αποκρυφισμού και πολιτικής, καθώς και για την αστική ανάπτυξη. Δεν είναι απαραίτητη η τεχνολογία, στο βαθμό που πρόκειται και για μια ατομική διαδικασία περιπλάνησης που σου δίνει τη δυνατότητα να μάθεις περισσότερα για την προσωπική σου σχέση με την πόλη και την ιστορία.

Η ψυχογεωγραφία χρησιμοποιήθηκε από την ομάδα AAA σαν στρατηγική εξόδου. Δεν ήταν καθόλου άσχημη ευκαιρία για να συγκεντρωθούμε. Η Διαγαλαξιακή σύνοδος της ΑΑΑ στην Μπολόνια το 1998 κατέστρωσε ένα πρόγραμμα εξερεύνησης των δώδεκα πυλών στην περίμετρο του ιστορικού κέντρου της πόλης, που είναι αφιερωμένα στα δώδεκα ζώδια. Κατά τη σύνοδο, η ΑΑΑ του Ανατολικού Λονδίνου κάλεσε τους Αυτόνομους Αστροναύτες να ακολουθήσουν το μονοπάτι του Giordano Bruno στο Λονδίνο, υπό τον τίτλο “διεκδικούμε ξανά τα άστρα” (reclaim the stars). Ο συγγραφέας του έργου “η Αποπομπή του Κτήνους που Θριαμβεύει“παραδόθηκε στην πυρά στη Ρώμη το 1600 για αιρετικές απόψεις και αφού είχε διακηρύξει την πολυσυλλεκτικότητα του ζωντανού κόσμου και ως εκ τούτου ετράπη σε φυγή διωκόμενος από τη μια έως την άλλη άκρη της Ευρώπης. Η πρωτοβουλία “Διεκδικούμε ξανά τα Αστρα ” της ΑΑΑ ήταν ένα από τα ψυχογεωγραφικά γεγονότα μέσα στο ευρύτερο πλαίσιο της κίνησης “Διεκδικούμε ξανά του Δρόμους”(reclaim the streets). Η ευρύτερη πλατφόρμα διήρκεσε 18 ημέρες με δράσεις ενάντια στο οικονομικό κέντρο, στο Σίτι του Λονδίνου (οι δράσεις αναφέρονται συνήθως ως Ιούνιος-18) και σ’αυτά περιλαμβάνεται και το φεστιβάλ της κίνησης ΑΑΑ “Διάστημα 1999″.

Το 1999, η ομάδα της Νέας Ζηλανδίας (ΑΑΑ-Aotearoa) διηγήθηκε την ιστορία της απογείωσης ενός αερόστατου με θερμό αέρα στο Garden Place of Hamilton (NZ). Ηταν μια παράσταση θεάτρου δρόμου ενάντια στις δοκιμές του Αμερικανικού αμυντικού προγράμματος βαλιστικών πυραύλων (BMD) στον Ειρηνικό. Στο τέλος, ακολούθησαν όλοι το αερόστατο μέχρι που χάθηκε.

Το Ολλανδικό τμήμα των αυτόνομων αστροναυτών λέγεται Jungle AAA και το παγκόσμιο project που αναπτύσσουν είναι το Social Fiction , το οποίο περιλαμβάνει και έργα “Γενετικής Ψυχογεωγραφίας” (generative psychogeography).
Ενας άλλος πιθανός ορισμός της ψυχογεωγραφίας θα μπορούσε να είναι ότι πρόκειται για μια δραστηριότητα που προσπαθεί να αποκρυπτογραφήσει πώς η γνωσιακή εικόνα που διατηρούμε για ένα τόπο έχει διαμορφωθεί από τον σχεδιασμό του χώρου, επιχειρώντας την επανασύνδεση της εικόνας με την πραγματικότητα, μέσα από την εξερεύνηση του χώρου με μη συμβατικούς τρόπους.

Παρατηρείται ένας ολοένα αυξανόμενος αριθμός ψυχογεωγραφικών ομάδων ανά τον κόσμο όπως η Ψυχογεωγραφική Μονάδα του Nottingham, ο ψυχογεωγραφικός σύνδεσμος του Ontario, ο ψυχογεωγραφικός σύνδεσμος Νέας Υόρκης, ο ψυχογεωγραφικός σύνδεσμος Λονδίνου (LPA). To ’92, η τελευταία οργάνωση επανέφερε στη ζωή την Ψυχογεωγραφική Επιτροπή Λονδίνου δημοσιεύοντας ένα μεγάλο αριθμό ενημερωτικών επιστολών και ψυχογεωγραφικών εξερευνήσεων μέσα στην πρωτεύουσα. Μπορώ επίσης να αναφέρω τον Ψυχογεωγραφικό Σύνδεσμο Ποδηλατών. Οι άξονες που τους ενδιαφέρουν είναι η Αστική ανάπτυξη, η ιστορία, τα κοινωνικά κινήματα, οι χώροι ιστορικής σημασίας, χώροι αποκρυφισμού, χώροι οικονομικής δραστηριότητας και οι περιοχές προσωρινής παραμονής/κόμβοι μετακίνησης.

Αν και οι ψυχογεωγράφοι διαφοροποιούνται από την Αστική Εξερεύνηση δεδομένου ότι η τεχνική τους είναι λιγότερο πολιτική και περισσότερο παιγνιώδης, νομίζω πως οι τεχνικές καλυμμένης διείσδυσης γίνονται όλο και πιο επίκαιρες, σε κοινωνίες ολικού ελέγχου όπως αυτές που ζούμε. Θα δώσω λίγα παραδείγματα :

Infiltration
Είναι μια Καναδική ομάδα που διατηρεί σελίδες στο διαδίκτυο και δημοσιεύουν κι ένα περιοδικό που λέγεται “Going places you’re not supposed to go”. Περιγράφουν τους εαυτούς τους σαν κάποιου είδους “φορέα εσωτερικού τουρισμού που επιτρέπει στους ανθρώπους με περιέργεια να ανακαλύψουν παρασκηνιακά τοπία”.
Η ομάδα δημοσιεύει επιφυλλίδες, συμβουλές για εξερευνήσεις, πληροφορίες, άρθρα για πρόσφατες αποστολές και συνεντεύξεις. Ολα αυτά διανθίζονται με χάρτες, εικόνες και διαγράμματα. Το τεύχος 19, Σεπτέμβριος ’02 με τίτλο ” Οίκοι Αγιότητας ” σκανάρει κάθε σπιθαμή εδάφους στα άδυτα και μυστικά μέρη των εκκλησιών.

Jinx Project
Αυτό είναι το περιοδικό της Παγκόσμιας Αστικής Περιπέτειας. Δημοσιεύουν αναφορές σε αστικές εξερευνήσεις και διεθνείς αποστολές, μαζί με συλλογές υλικού από Φίλους και Εχθρούς. Το περιοδικό εκδίδεται σε μη τακτά διαστήματα, από το ’97. Υπάρχει στο διαδίκτυο από το 2001. Το Jinx Project (όπως λένε στις σελίδες τους) είναι μια παγκόσμια οργάνωση διαχείρισης πληροφοριών που δεν ελέγχεται από κυβερνήσεις αλλά δεσμεύεται μόνο από την εμμονή για την υπεράσπιση της ελευθερίας ενάντια σε κάθε επιβουλή..

Θα τελειώσω με την ομάδα
Warchalking
Ετσι ονομάζεται η πρακτική της χάραξης μιας σειράς συμβόλων σε πεζοδρόμια και τοίχους ώστε να δείχνεις σε ποιά σημεία υπάρχει ασύρματη πρόσβαση στο διαδίκτυο. Κατ’αυτό τον τρόπο, άλλοι χρήστες μπορούν να ανοίξουν τους φορητούς υπολογιστές και να αξιοποιήσουν τη δυνατότητα σύνδεσης. Η έμπνευση σχετίζεται με τους Χόμπο (αυτούς τους περιπλανώμενους άστεγους και απόκληρους μιας κοινωνίας που είχε υποστεί οικονομικό κραχ και βρισκόταν σε ύφεση) και οι οποίοι συνήθιζαν να κάνουν σημάδια με κιμωλία για να θυμώνται ποια σπίτια ήταν φιλικά στους ζητιάνους. Η πρώτη απόπειρα χρήσης τέτοιων συμβόλων κατέληξε σε τρία είδη: δυο ημικύκλια πλάτη με πλάτη για να δείχνουν ανοιχτούς κόμβους, ένας κύκλος που δείχνει κλειστούς κόμβους και τέλος, ένας κύκλος με το γράμμα W για να δείχνει κρυπτογραφημένους κόμβους WEP (Wireless Equivalent Privacy, ένα πρωτόκολλο ασφαλείας) στους οποίους το κοινό δεν μπορεί λογικά να καταφέρει να έχει πρόσβαση. Κάθε σύμβολο έχει πάνω-πάνω κι ένα κωδικό πρόσβασης στον κόμβο (SSID, service set identifier), που συνήθως αποσπάται εύκολα με διάφορα λογισμικά που κυκλοφορούν στο διαδίκτυο.

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2 Οκτωβρίου 2014

kaput.gr

Filed under: ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ — admin @ 15:20

http://www.kaput.gr/gr/07/%CE%BF-%CF%81%CE%B5%CE%B1%CE%BB%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%CF%8C%CF%82-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9-%CE%BF-%CF%87%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%81%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%CF%8C%CF%82/

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10 Απριλίου 2013

sound 33-sight-motion

Filed under: NOTES ON ANIMATION,NOTES ON VIDEO,ΑΝΑΚΟΙΝΩΣΕΙΣ,ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ — admin @ 17:03

Sight Sound Motion
Chapter 6 – The 2D Field: Area
Screen Space: fixed borders that defines the new aesthetic characteristics
• Aspect ratio: relationship of screen width to screen height
• Horizontal orientation
• Standard ratios
• Standard TV / computer screens adopted 4×3 ratio of early motion
pictures (1.33:1 ratio)
• Digital / HDTV – 16×9 (5.33×3 or 178:1)
• Standard wide screen of motion pictures (5.33×3 or 1.85:1)
• Panavision / Cinemascope has extremely wide aspect ratio – 7×3
(2.35:1)
• Wide-screen – format of most U.S. films
• Framing
• 4×3 frame (film standard was established as early as 1889)
• advantage is that the difference between screen width & height
does not emphasize one dimension over another
• works well with close-ups
• 16×9 frame
• have to pay more attention to the peripheral pictorial
elements/events
• Changing the Aspect Ratio
• Matching aspect ratio
• Letterboxing: wide screen letterbox is created by showing the whole
width & height of the original format, and masking the top and
bottom of the screen with black, white, or colored bands called
dead zones
• Pillarboxing: fitting a standard 4×3 image onto a 16×9 screen
(vertical pillar bars)
• Cutting, stretching, squeezing
• Secondary Frames
• Masking – blacking out both sides of the screen (ex. D.W. Griffith –
Intolerance)
• Multiple screens
• Moving camera
• Object size > context
• Knowledge of object
• Relation to screen area
• Environment & scale
• Reference to a person
• Image size
• Size constancy – we perceive people and their environments as
normal sized regardless of screen size
• Image size & relative energy

• Requires constant psychological closure
• Facilitating Closure – low definition image is helpful only if it facilitates,
rather than inhibits, closure
• Proximity – when similar elements lie in close proximity to one
another we tend to see them together
• Similarity – similar shapes are seen together
• Continuity – once a dominant line is established its direction is not
easily disturbed by other lines cutting across it
Vectors – directional forces that lend our eyes from one point to another (force
with direction & magnitude)
• Vector Field – combination of vectors operating within a single picture field;
picture field to picture field; picture sequence to picture sequence; screen to
screen; on screen to off screen events
• Vector Types
• Graphic Vector – stationary element that guides our eyes in a certain
direction
• Ambiguous direction
• Index Vector – points in a specific direction
• Vector Magnitude – determined by screen direction, graphic mass, perceived
object speed
• Z-axis vector: points toward or away from the camera
• The larger the graphic mass in motion, the higher its vector magnitude
• The faster the speed of an object the higher its vector magnitude
• Vector Directions
• Continuing Vectors – point in the same direction
• Converging Vectors – point toward each other
• Diverging Vectors – point away from each other
Chapter 8 – Structuring the 2D Field: Interplay of Screen Forces
Stabilizing the Field Through Distribution of Graphic Mass & Magnetic Force
• Graphic Weight
• Dimension
• Shape
• Orientation
• Location
• Color
• Hue
• Saturation
• Brightness
• Screen Center – most stable position of an object
• Off Center – the more the object moves off center the greater its

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9 Δεκεμβρίου 2012

Filed under: Notes,ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ — admin @ 17:27

REVIEW ESSAY

The micro-physics of theoretical production and border crossings

Jason Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the
Pre-history of the Present (New York: SUNY Press, 2003)

Angela Mitropoulos

The encounter between the flows of money and those who have nothing
but their labour power to sell is constitutive of and constituted by new desires,
new habits and new subjectivities.

—Jason Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital.

1. If for Althusser it seemed necessary to read “to the letter”—by which he did not mean a kind of punctilious scholasticism but alertness to both overt meanings and hesitations—it was just as important to declare what sort of reading one is guilty of. This is as much a review of a book that brilliantly puts that approach to work reading a number of theorists as it is a reading with regard for particular struggles and debates. What interests me here, given that I share the theoretical perspectives which inform The Micro-Politics of Capital, are what I see as the more troublesome details of those perspectives as they are brought to bear on political practices, specifically recent struggles around border policing and the writing of them.

2. The connection between these theories and political practices is hardly incidental; however, this is far from asserting that those political practices derived from these theories. In any case, the emergence of the noborder networks and associated protests (such as that at Woomera in 2002) are inseparable from a wider dissemination of the theories referenced by MPC. Briefly put: the movements of undocumented migrants have disrupted forms of subjectivity and representation bestowed by the nation-state, calling for a political practice and solidarity adequate to this challenge. Therefore, theories that speak to these questions are assured of importance. Nevertheless, in the struggles against border controls what is at stake in the detail of those analyses becomes more pronounced.

3. In 1999, xborder was formed by a handful of people as a space in which to explore the practical and theoretical implications of the autonomous movements of the undocumented. At minimum, this amounted to reversing the usual sociological-political definitions of what a movement is, entailing an insistence on a materialism of physics over a demographics of visibility and mediation—which is to say, requiring an attentiveness to the physics of class composition (as elaborated by Sergio Bologna). Because of this regard, xborder shared an idiom with some others in the noborder networks (from the Netherlands, Germany and Mexico) who assembled a conjunction between newer forms of work and communication and undocumented movements by adopting the language and topography of the net: xborder, makeworld, border=0, etc. The conjunction was deliberate and strategic: the development of a shared dialect of mobility, precarity and escape expressed in both vernacular and organisational forms.

4. Yet the particulars of the relationship between representation, media and visibility remained to be worked out in practice, often through oblique debates over the specifics of organisational structure and methods. That is, while the noborder networks were indeed distinguished (as Illuminati wrote in a discussion of unrepresentable citizenship) by “a ‘letting-be’ that is set against institutional arrogance”, in actual terms this meant that there co-existed both the not-yet-represented (which searches in lobbyist fashion for representation) and the radical refusal of representation” (Illuminati 1996:167). That said, we can consider the book at hand and the theoretical register in which those discussions were often articulated.

5. Much of MPC is taken up with an examination of the concepts of transition, specifically Marx’s treatment of the transition from pre-capitalist to a specifically capitalist mode of production. Pivotal to this analysis are the concepts of formal and real subsumption, in whose distinction Marx sought to indicate an historical metamorphosis in the form of labour and, as its correlate, changes to the forms of command, exploitation and violence. The analysis sought to describe a shift from the violence of mastery to that of self-regulation which characterises wage labour and its putative contractual freedoms in a more contemporary idiom: the processes of habituation, the engagement of affects and formations of identity. In short: the production of subjectivity, at once subjugated and subjectified, presenting as the agentic subject of the wage contract and exploited in so doing. Alongside these transformations in the character of labour come changes to both the scope and form of capitalist exploitation, the social diffusion of capital into spaces and activities (such as theoretical practices) that previously existed outside the immediate relations of production, even if occasionally applied to it.

6. This analysis of real and formal subsumption has been influential among variously ‘heretical’ Marxists (e.g., Negri and Althusser), while any reference to affects, subjectivation and habituation raises many of the questions that preoccupied Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari. Yet, as Read shows, what brings the aforementioned writers to bear here is not their political or philosophical conformity but their contemporaneity. As Warren Montag remarks on the cover of MPC, “This represents the perspective of a generation no longer constrained by the notion of opposing theoretical camps so prevalent in the 1980s and ’90s.” More acutely than this, MPC indicates the perspective of a generation for whom the standard academic distinctions between the economy, society, politics and culture—or between analyses of subjectivity and labour- make little tangible sense. Drawing on various writers associated with Potere Operaio andAutonomia (Negri, Tronti, Virno), as well as Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Read deploys a number of concepts such as immaterial labour, general intellect, social capital, immanent causality and the multitude so as to elaborate on the subjective transformations that might be said to characterise the present conjuncture. The concept of immaterial labour, for instance, specifies the rise of informational, communicative and affective labour in the organisation of capitalist valorisation and exploitation. Therefore it, along with other changes Read carefully describes, assumes “capital’s direct involvement in the production of subjectivity” (2003: 159). This book is an important and often quite brilliant work.

7. To underscore what is at stake in this contemporaneity: while the above analysis poses the question of transformations within capitalism, it thereby complicates the related question—if one feels obliged to ask it—of what against might consist of. For if capitalism works directly on the affects, desires and through habituation, and if both the creativity and exploitation of immaterial labour functions on and through this terrain, then, to the extent that this analysis is not always directed and diverted elsewhere (at others), two simple yet perilous questions should present themselves: Why does one take up a book (any book) to read and why might one write? This echoes one of Althusser’s reasons for paying homage to Spinoza, but restates it explicitly as a problem of the affective, subjective disposition of intellectual and political practices in a context of immaterial labour. To foreground those perils: how might one even begin to answer those questions given that knowledge, desire, subjectivity, and therefore the practices of reading and writing are part of the circuitry of capitalist production, when it is no longer (simply) a question of recuperation but of entanglement?

8. In opening MPC with this citation from Althusser—that “Marxist theory can fall behind history, and even behind itself, if it ever believes that it has arrived”—Read signals a politics of reading (and writing) which promises to exceed the conditions of its (or any books) production and reception. As Read puts it in a discussion of Foucault and Marx, if subjectivity is not exterior to power but constituted as a moment of it, then the question of resistance is a question of “invention irreducible to its conditions” (2003: 90). To put the above in an other way: the least disquieting way to approach MPC is as a comparative study of a number of more or less well-known theorists whom we might feel obliged to cite, either indifferently or as markers of theoretical accomplishment. In this sense, the book could function as handy canonical summation or, equally comfortably, as proof of the worst hopes of those who prophesied against the rise of ‘postmodernism’: evidence of a deep intellectual complicity between Althusser, Foucault and Deleuze in a scheme to liquidate humanity and destroy the revolutionary integrity of Marxism. But differentiation here was at the same time a gesture of constitution: the category of autonomist marxism was produced in the organisation of an Anglophone political-academic franchise; so too was the designation of Althusser and Balibar as structuralists, and of Foucault and Deleuze as poststructuralists or postmodernists. For English-language readers, the writings of Deleuze, Negri, Althusser et al could only be received by way of translation, through exegeses written in the realist mode of the textbook, and (until the expansion of the internet) within the circumferences of the academic publishing industry. Here, both assertions of distinction and the assembly of imagined communities are at a premium, forming the reigning covenant under which markets (rather: niche markets) are constituted and academic or intellectual labour is put into circulation and valorised.

9. In other words, the physics of translation functioned here as a deterritorialisation of idioms that were transacted and given expression through acts of re-territorialisation. This marshaling of distinguished communities, of course, finds its political analogue in factions and parties, whose arrangement behind proper names (such as Marx, Trotsky, Negri and so on) and assertions of fidelity to them likewise operate as a form of niche-marketing, as markers of a habitus in which potential readers are also potential consumers/recruits. Read, however, is quite clear that he is neither concerned to “distinguish between proper and improper interpretations of Marx nor to produce a sort of intellectual counter-history” (2003: 7 & 15). Nor does he wish to “adjudicate between Marxism and post-structuralism as methods or antagonistic camps within academia.”MPC is, thankfully, not another guidebook for inter-disciplinary harmonisation or bridge-building, a programme for smoothing over the antagonisms where they do appear. The symptomatic reading that Althusser elaborated was not presented as a better form of analysis as such, but as a means to open up a text to the radical creativity of antagonism, to explore how writing—and reading too—continually conflicts with its own internal limits (2003:160) and those of its mode of production.

10. Nevertheless, it is quite conceivable that by setting aside its politics of reading, MPCmight well be received as an instance of a new political denomination rather than the disruption of academic or political habits. After all, as Read contends—following Althusser—habits are indeed the means by which particular forms of subjection are naturalised, the ways in which contingency is transformed into necessity. Academics in order to continue being academics must publish; political factions must persuade and recruit to be maintained as such. The content of such does not really matter, just as—or rather: because—capitalist valorisation is indifferent to content. “In the case of both the commodity form and abstract labour the issue is how things, or practices, in their diverse or heterogeneous particularity” (2003: 70) are related, exchanged and made exchangeable.

11. This too is a matter of physics rather than the manifestation of (unconscious) beliefs which may then be overturned through, as Leninists would have it, a struggle against forms of ‘false consciousness’. Physics, then: it is above all a question of bodies in motion (and thus of resistances, stasis, inertia, entropy and direction) well before it assumes the semblance of any ethical or political dilemma. Immaterial labour is no less materialised or given effect through its quotidian practices, however linguistic or communicative those practices are, than is the labour that through its motions produces paper. But unlike the latter, immaterial labour is characterised by the requirement to—as Lazzarato has argued—’become subjects’, which entails reposing the hierarchy between autonomy and command at a higher level rather than abolishing it, thus mobilising and “clashing with the very personality of the individual worker”. It is not a question therefore of the external imposition of power but of a pressure given public expression in the imperative to communicate, the demands to be active, to communicate, to relate to others which admonishes and materialises the subjective forms of immaterial labour (Lazzarato cited in Read 2003:148). Not at all surprising, then, that silence or a refusal to compete (rather than dissent) is here registered not only as impolite, but as aggressive—above all, the conversation must continue, the game of exchange must be adhered to. (A notable instance of this imperative appeared in the case of Merlin Luck, who rather than speak at his televised eviction from Big Brother and thank his host for the product placement, opted to tape his mouth and hold up a note calling for refugees to be freed from Australia’s internment camps. He was accused of being aggressive, to which he responded by re-entering the game of communication (tv interviews, radio talkback, etc) and, subsequently, talking about how much he loved Australia and wished to become its citizen.)

12. Content does not matter so much; what matters is the form. As Read argues with more than a nod to Deleuze and Guattari: “There is no possible contestation at the level of code or belief.” Antagonism does not take place through a conflict or competition between beliefs, this or that form of consciousness, however false or true they may be declared in the constitution of brand names. Capitalism operates through the axiomatic, the “differential relation between abstract and quantitative flows.” Capital produces an indifference to and abstraction of concrete labours, the qualitative differences between the creation of this or that. Pluralism is perpetually flexible—codes can be added and exploited in an infinite categorical and innovative expansion. It does not really matter what anyone believes, even less because public assertions of belief habitually indicate a cynical or opportunistic adherence to ‘whatever’—a condition that Virno has argued characterises the ‘general intellect’. For Read:

The epochal distinction between precapitalist and the capitalist mode of production is not only a distinction between subjective and objective domination but also a shift in how this domination is lived. Whereas prior to capitalism it is lived through the codes, structures of belief and personal subjugation, in capitalism it is lived through abstract operative rules, which are not necessarily believed or grasped. (2003: 71)

13. Given all this, it is useful to press at the limits of MPC. In the first instance, this is to specify what Read identifies as the limits of a more traditional reading of Marx, namely, humanism and economism, that is: the reduction of the movement of history to (and therefore the constraint of possible futures by) essence and teleology—the one cause, declared as either the immutable form of labour, human nature, the economy or so on. The question that follows from this, then, is to what extent MPC escapes (or at least irritates) these limits, including the limits which flow from and are related to the above analysis of immaterial labour, real subsumption and so forth. Read says:

In a way I have perhaps mirrored Marx’s own error. He became so engaged with his ‘critique of political economy’ […] that he often neglected to propose much with respect to the difficult questions of political organisation and struggle. (2003:160)

14. He does not mean by this that theory should assume the role of announcing blueprints: “there is no theoretical resolution to the problem of antagonism in real subsumption” (2003:151). What I take this as is a frustration with the limits of the mode of exposition: (a) the historical schematisation of capitalism, which arranges the subsequent investigation into the problem Read identifies initially as “the paradoxical conjunction of the expansion of capital and the exhaustion of any critical vocabulary with which to confront it” (2003:2); and, (b) the recourse to proper names. In this sense, MPC’sdistance from particular struggles becomes manifest not as an irrelevance—far from it—but as a hesitation before the difficulties of an antagonistic theoretical practice which produces not a hermeneutics but an intervention into specific struggles and the conditions of their writing and theorisation.

15. The quote from Althusser that opens MPC is not simply a disclaimer of systematicity. It is a claim for a materialism of theoretical practice: thinking, no matter how much it seeks to assign to itself a pre-eminent status in history, is only intelligible and creative through “the precariousness of history”—of movement; it is always endangered and made dangerous through this flux. (Althusser, 1983: 17) Historical schema—even if only intended for expositional purposes—tend to calm this flux and, in the presentation of the epochal, stage a hermeneutic subject who can declare the new and thereby distinguish itself from both this complexity and “the indistinct masses who supposedly inhabit the ruins [of that declared superseded by the new] without knowing it” (Ranciere 1991: 246). The assertion of a new epoch, whatever else its advantages might be, serves to implicitly divert the force of the analysis elsewhere: being able to declare the new is to assume the pose of an agentic subject rather than explore one’s own subjection. Raising this question might have allowed for a discussion of the substantial differences between Virno, Lazzarato and Negri on the question of immaterial labour and the multitude, of the extent to which Negri and Hardt, for instance, invest the latter with the character of a (newer more adequate) vanguard.

16. What is the relationship between the declaration of the new, the epochal, and what Lazzarato discerns as the form of exploitation particular to immaterial labour: the slogan ‘become subjects’, the compulsion to communicate, network, to constantly circulate and be visible within the marketplace of ideas as it were? Many of the debates among those in the noborder networks rested on the specific answers given to this question: was no borders a slogan; a demand (and, if so, on whom?); a means to recruit people to an organisation with ostensibly better ideas than other organisations in the political marketplace; a form of consciousness-raising; a cynical or whatever declaration of belonging and identity—a brand name—with no implications for the form of political organisation or practice? More sharply, and with particular reference to Woomera2002: do political actions aim to alter what people think or to disrupt the physics in which they have been habituated? In many ways, these debates occurred because the composition of noborder struggles was premised on a conjunction between immaterial workers and undocumented migrants. It was, therefore, not only a debate about the difficulties involved in the relation between the two—which could never be asserted as commensurate in their misery—but a debate about the contradictory dispositions within the former.

17. Even if the periodisation of the new is not, as Read notes, an argument for any wholesale displacement, it is an answer to the question of the pertinence of particular forms of labour for the organisation of capitalism. Lurking behind this question of pertinence is the rather traditional marxian search for the effective subject of history and of revolution. We know that the answer given here—the multitude—has shaken its explicitly humanist and economistic formulations. However, it has not, for all that, quite abandoned its teleological or pluralist-synthetic dynamics in some instances. For Negri and Hardt, the multitude reveals the destiny of global citizenship—which is to say a global state or, in Spinozian terms: absolute democracy. I have discussed global citizenship and rights previously in Borderlands and elsewhere. Suffice to note here that this absolutisation of democracy expresses the universalisation of abstract labour in its juridical formand rights are indeed the correlate of abstract labour, as Read notes (2003: 150). The “social factory” that Tronti analysed is, in the proposition of global citizenship, transformed into the juridical conditions of the global factory.

18. If, as Marx says, communism is the movement which abolishes the present state of things, it is not a question of seeking out an ontological consistency (Negri) but of working on the inconsistencies, in the flux (and reflux) of history rather than engaging the rather Hegelian formula of “recognition, consciousness, revolution” which distinguishes Negri’s analyses of class composition from those of, say, Bologna (Negri 1991: 162). For Negri—and the Tute Bianche (White Overalls) who gave the closest practical expression to his analyses—the aim was therefore one of recognition and visibility, of making undocumented migrants visible on the plane of mediation. For the Tute Bianche “the white overalls give us visibility in the spectacular/mediatic space” (White Overalls). All this gestures toward long-standing disagreements within European ‘autonomist’ circles: Sergio Bologna’s disposition toward ‘the tribe of moles’ has been echoed by Yann Moulier-Boutang who, reflecting on the Italian movements of the late 1970s, stated that of the “invisible party of Mafiori” he much preferred the invisible to the party aspects. These differences over recognition, visibililty and mediation continue to mark recent struggles. Franco Barchiesi, among others, has argued persuasively against the self-evidence of “inclusion” approaches in migration struggles. Moreover, the concrete practices of tactical media which predominated among the noborder networks (Garcia and Lovink 1997) diverged between a tactical media applied alongside a tactical clandestinity; or media as strategy, as a form of lobbying of the not-yet-represented.

19. Moreover, if computerisation and the net displace the centrality of the university in the elaboration of intellectual practices (and the development of the general intellect), just as the restructuring of the labour process and forms of labour generally make Leninism and the Party obsolete, these changes do not abolish, as Lazzarato says in relation to immaterial labour, the hierarchy of command and autonomy which inflects such prior formulations, but reposition it at a higher level. Therefore, the destitution of those forms of representation recognised by the nation-state and the forms of politics which remain tributary to it, and their inadequacy to the current conjuncture cannot therefore simply be declared. A critique of Fordist forms of political practice is not sufficient. It is also a matter of noting the limits of that declaration (the “perverse perseverence” of what is deemed past—see Burke 2002 and Caffentzis 1998) and the ways in which that hierarchy is reinstated in the declaration.

20. The hierarchy between command and autonomy—while dispensing with its outdated versions such as the party cadre—becomes diffused in the form of a practice which re-asserts versions of that hierarchy in the distinction between activists-intellectuals and everyone else, whom apparently neither think nor act politically. The identity of the activist (or intellectual) is meaningless without the assertion of a specialised, transcendental status in relation to the world and to others. And, in its particular manifestation around border struggles, it rendered two responses to the movements of the undocumented, which are distinguished only by the stratum of their juridical recourse: national and global. The first, irreversibly shaken and therefore in decline, but dogged in its calls for a nation-state that might somehow be capable of going beyond the limits of national recognition; the second, pressing for a more adequate de jure recognition of those global undocumented movements through the de facto proposition that ‘no one is illegal’.

21. Arguing against the overture of the ostensible benefits of inclusion—and not perhaps because of a familiarity with Agamben’s arguments on the intrinsic relationship between inclusion and exclusion as it manifests in the nomos of the camp—Borderhack from Tijuana responded: Somos Todos Ilegales / We Are All Illegal (Fran Illich, Borderhack 2002 Panel discussion, makeworld conference, Munich). In 2001, the slogan for the European Border camp was changed from ‘No One Is Illegal’ to ‘Everyone Is Illegal’. In the same year, another group calling itself ‘No One Is Illegal’ was established in Melbourne.

22. It was always a question of physics, spatial organisation and representation, including the presentation of the connection between the two in the understanding of the transitional. Here, Marx’s discussion of the violent origins of capitalism—the enclosures, laws against vagabondage, etc—cannot be relegated to the past but need to be restated as mechanisms held in perpetual reserve by capital, through which it transforms the organisation of space and exploitation. The enclosures, the poorhouses and forced labour are not in some Dickensian past—they alter in form but their centrality to the processes of violent reconstitution and the restoration of exploitation remain. That is: they become globalised as people attempt to escape previously dominant manifestations of the enclosures which are thereby rendered inadequate by that exodus. The millions of undocumented migrants have provoked not only a frenzy of national border controls but also the extension of the jurisdictional reach of particular nation-states and the emergence of a militarised, global humanitarianism, always threatening to intervene on their behalf if people spill over the appropriate lines on the map. The development of a global jurisdictional reach—or more affably put: global citizenship—is an innovation in the organisation of the enclosures; it is not a challenge to them. “The social rights State distributes legality in order to reintegrate the underprivileged within the fiction of a guaranteed community in exchange for renouncing the virtual subversiveness of difference” (Illuminati: 1996: 176). The exodus has already prompted the juridical, military and fiscal organisation of a global state architecture from which no exodus will be possible except, to put it in Agamben’s terms, at the sheer threshold between life and death. The possibility of flight assumes conflicts between jurisdictions—the hypothesis of global jurisdiction makes such flight impossible.

23. As is the case with all theory, MPC lags behind events and struggles, which in no way makes it a less important or intelligent work. But that falling behind is discernible in the all-too-brief discussion on the common that concludes MPC. Divested of MPCs critique of the wage-form and capital, ‘the common’ may well be taken as license for the establishment of consolatory forms of belonging and identity, if not simply more brand names. The ‘inoperative community’ (as described by Blanchot and Nancy) seems a more accurate description of the experience of the multitude, which is for some—as Illuminati wrote—”the practical beginnings of communism and for others a liberalism of the market. The movement of the exodus is ambiguously marked by the opposition to dominant ideas and their molecular renewal” (Illuminati 1996:168-71). That renewal takes shape in the failure to disrupt the form and micro-physics of wage labour, which includes—in the global factory—its diffusion as particular forms of intellectual and political practice.

24. To conclude what cannot be a conclusive discussion: the antagonistic force of much of the abovementioned analyses (Foucault, Althusser, Potere Operaio, Autonomia, Guattari) does not I think rest in their declaration of the epochal but in their attention to the transitional. Crossing the border is a permanent condition of critical practice, especially insofar as the particular position of that border is in the process of shifting in response to the wave of border crossings which have been occurring for over twenty years now.

Angela Mitropoulos has been involved in and written on border struggles since 1998, including producing the websites for xborder, woomera2002 and flotilla2004.

Bibliography

Althusser, L. & Balibar, E. (1983). Reading Capital, London: Verso.

Burke, A. (2002). ‘The Perverse Perseverance of Sovereignty’ Borderlands 1:2 athttp://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol1no2_2002/burke_perverse.html

Caffentzis, C. (1998). ‘The End of Work or the Renaissance of Slavery? A Critique of Rifkin and Negri’ at http://korotonomedya.net/otonomi/caffentzis.html

Garcia, D. & Lovink, G. (1997) ‘The ABC of Tactical Media’ at http://www.waag.org/tmn

Illuminati, A. (1996). ‘Unrepresentable Citizenship’ in P. Virno and M. Hardt (eds) Radical thought in Italy Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press pp.166-85.

Mitropoulos, A. (2004) “Precari-Us?” Mute n.29

Negri, A. (1991). Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, New York: Autonomedia.

Ranciere, J. (1991). ‘After What?’ in E. Cadava, P. Connor, and J-L. Nancy (eds) Who Comes After the Subject? New York: Routledge, 246-252.

Read, J. (2003). The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Pre-history of the Present, New York: SUNY Press.

No border sites

border=0: http://www.tmcrew.org/border0
http://borderhack.org
http://kein.org/makeworld
http://noborder.org
One Is Illegal: http://antimedia.net/nooneisillegal
http://thistuesday.org
Bianche (Disobedienti): http://nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/tute/index.htm
http://antimedia.net/xborder

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18 Ιουνίου 2010

Impossible Participation or Power as the Sum of Constraint

Filed under: NOTES ON EVERYDAY LIFE,ΚΕΙΜΕΝΑ — admin @ 09:08

Published in The Revolution of Everyday Life 1967

Chapter 4 “Suffering”

Suffering caused by natural alienation has given way to suffering caused by social alienation, while remedies have become justifications (1). Where there is no justification, exorcism takes its place (2). But from now on no subterfuge can hide the existence of an organization based on the distribution of constraints (3). Consciousness reduced to the consciousness of constraints is the antechamber of death. The despair of consciousness makes the murderers of Order; the consciousness of despair makes the murderers of Disorder (4).
The symphony of spoken and shouted words animates the scenery of the streets. Over a rumbling basso continuo develop grave and cheerful themes, hoarse and singsong voices, nostalgic fragments of sentences. There is a sonorous architecture which overlays the outline of streets and buildings, reinforcing or counteracting the attractive or repulsive tone of a district. But from Notting Hill to Oxford Street the basic chord is the same everywhere: it’s sinister resonance has sunk so deeply into everyone’s mind that it no longer surprises them. “That’s life”, “These things are sent to try us”, “You have to take the rough with the smooth”, “That’s the way it goes”… this lament whose weft unites the most diverse conversations has so perverted our sensibility that it passes for the commonest of human dispositions. Where it is not accepted, despair disappears from sight. Nobody seems worried that joy has been absent from European music for nearly two centuries; which says everything. Consume, consume: the ashes have consumed the fire.
How have suffering and it’s rites of exorcism usurped this importance? Undoubtedly because of the struggle to survive imposed on the first men by a hostile nature, full of cruel and mysterious forces. In the face of danger, the weakness of men discovered in social agglomeration not only protection but a way of co-operating with nature, making a truce with her and even transforming her. In the struggle against natural alienation — death, sickness, suffering — alienation became social. We escaped the rigours of exposure, hunger and discomfort only to fall into the trap of slavery. We were enslaved by gods, by men, by language. And such a slavery had its positive side: there was a certain greatness of living in terror of a god who also made you invincible. This mixture of human and inhuman would, it is true, be a sufficient explanation of the ambiguity of suffering, its way of appearing right through history at once as shameful sickness and salutary evil — as a good thing, after a fashion. But this would be to overlook the ignoble slag of religion, above all Christian mythology, which devoted all its genius to perfecting this morbid and depraved precept: protect yourself against mutilation by mutilating yourself!
“Since Christ’s coming, we are delivered not from the evil of suffering but from the evil of suffering uselessly”, writes the Jesuit father Charles. How right he is: power’s problem has always been, not to abolish itself, but to give itself reasons so as not to oppress ‘uselessly’. Christianity, that unhealthy therapeutic, pulled off its masterstroke when it married man to suffering, whether on the basis of divine grace or natural law. From prince to manager, from priest to expert, from father confessor to social worker, it is always the principle of useful suffering and willing sacrifice which forms the most solid base for hierarchical power. Whatever reasons it invokes — a better world, the next world, building communism or fighting communism — suffering accepted is always Christian, always. Today the clerical vermin have given way to the missionaries of a Christ dyed red. Everywhere official pronouncements bear in their watermark the disgusting image of the crucified man, everywhere comrades are urged to sport the stupid halo of the militant martyr. And with their blood, the kitchen-hands of the good Cause are mixing up the sausage-meat of the future: less cannon-fodder, more doctrine-fodder!

To begin with, bourgeois ideology seemed determined to root out suffering with as much persistence as it devoted to the pursuit of the religions that it hated. Infatuated with progress, comfort, profit, well-being, it had enough weapons — if not real weapons, at least imaginary ones — to convince everyone of its will to put a scientific end to the evil of suffering and the evil of faith. As we know, all it did was to invent new anaesthetics and new superstitions.
Without God, suffering became ‘natural’, inherent in ‘human nature’; it would be overcome, but only after more suffering: the martyrs of science, the victims of progress, the lost generations. But in this very movement the idea of natural suffering betrayed its social root. When Human Nature was removed, suffering became social, inherent in social existence. But of course, revolutions demonstrated that the social evil of pain was not a metaphysical principle: that a form of society could exist from which the pain of living would be excluded. History shattered the social ontology of suffering, but suffering, far from disappearing, found new reasons for existence in the exigencies of History, which had suddenly become trapped, in its turn, in a one-way street. China prepares children for the classless society by teaching them love of their country, love of their family, and love of work. Thus historical ontology picks up the remains of all the metaphysical systems of the past: an sich, God, Nature, Man, Society. From now on, men will have to make history by fighting History itself, because History has become the last ontological earthwork of power, the last con by which it hides, behind the promise of a long weekend, its will to endure until Saturday which will never come. Beyond fetishised history, suffering is revealed as stemming from hierarchical social organization. And when the will to put an end to hierarchical power has sufficiently tickled the consciousness of men, everyone will admit that freedom in arms and weight of constraints have nothing metaphysical about them.

While it was placing happiness and freedom on the order of the day, technological civilization was inventing the ideology of happiness and freedom. Thus it condemned itself to creating no more than the freedom of apathy, happiness in passivity. But at least this invention, perverted though it was, had denied that suffering is inherent in the human condition, that such an inhuman condition could last forever. That is why bourgeois thought fails when it tries to provide consolation for suffering; none of its justifications are as powerful as the hope which was born from its initial bet on technology and well-being.
Desperate fraternity in sickness is the worst thing that can happen to civilization. In the twentieth century, death terrifies men less than the absence of real life. All these dead, mechanized, specialized actions, stealing a little bit of life a thousand times a day, until the exhaustion of mind and body, until that death which is not the end of life but the final saturation with absence; this is what lends a dangerous charm to dreams of apocalypses, gigantic destructions, complete annihilations, cruel, clean and total deaths. Auschwitz and Hiroshima are indeed the ‘comfort of nihilism’. Let impotence in the face of suffering become a collective sentiment, and the demand for suffering and death can sweep a whole community. Consciously or not, most people would rather die than live a permanently unsatisfying life. Look at anti-bomb marchers: most of them were nothing but penitents trying to exorcise their desire to disappear with all the rest of humanity. They would deny it, of course, but their miserable faces gave them away. The only real joy is revolutionary.
Perhaps it is in order to ensure that a universal desire to perish does not take hold of men that a whole spectacle is organized around particular sufferings. A sort of nationalized philanthropy impels man to find consolation for his own infirmities in the spectacle of other people’s.
Consider disaster photographs, stories of cuckolded singers, the ridiculous dramas of the gutter press; hospitals, asylums, and prisons: real museums of suffering for the use of those whose fear of entering them makes them happy to be outside. I sometimes feel such a diffuse suffering dispersed through me that I find relief in the chance misfortune that concretizes and justifies it, offers it a legitimate outlet. Nothing will dissuade me of this: the sadness I feel after a separation, a failure, a bereavement doesn’t reach me from outside like an arrow but wells up from inside me like a spring freed by a landslide. There are wounds which allow the spirit to utter a long-stifled cry. Despair never lets go its prey; it is only the prey which isolates despair in the end of a love or the death of a child, where there is only its shadow. Mourning is a pretext, a convenient way of spitting out nothingness in small drops. The tears, the cries and howls of childhood remain imprisoned in the hearts of men. For ever? In you also the emptiness is growing.

Another word about the alibis of power. Suppose that a tyrant took pleasure in throwing prisoners who had been flayed alive into a small cell; suppose that to hear their screams and see them scramble each time they brushed against one another amused him a lot, at the same time causing him to meditate on human nature and the curious behaviour of men. Suppose that at the same time and in the same country there were philosophers and wise men who explained to the worlds of science and art that suffering had to do with the collective life of men, the inevitable presence of Others, society as such — wouldn’t we be right to consider these men the tyrant’s watchdogs? By proclaiming such theses as these, a certain existentialist conception has demonstrated not only the collusion of left intellectuals with power, but also the crude trick by which an inhuman social organization attributes the responsibility for its cruelties to its victims themselves. A nineteenth century critic remarked: “Throughout contemporary literature we find the tendency to regard individual suffering as a social evil and to make the organization of society responsible for the misery and degradation of its members. This is a profoundly new idea: suffering is no longer treated as a matter of fatality.” Certain thinkers steeped in fatalism have not been troubled overmuch by such novelties: consider Sartre’s hell-is-other-people, Freud’s death instinct, Mao’s historical necessity. After all, what distinguishes these doctrines from the stupid “it’s just human nature”?
Hierarchical social organization is like a system of hoppers lined with sharp blades. While it flays us alive power cleverly persuades us that we are flaying each other. It is true that to limit myself to writing this is to risk fostering a new fatalism; but I certainly intend in writing it that nobody should limit himself to reading it.

Altruism is the other side of the coin of ‘hell-is-other-people’; only this time mystification appears under a positive sign. Let’s put an end to this old soldier crap once and for all! For others to interest me I must first find in myself the energy for such an interest. What binds me to others must grow out of what binds me to the most exuberant and demanding part of my will to live; not the other way round. It is always myself that I am looking for in other people; my enrichment, my realization. let everyone understand this and ‘each for himself’ taken to its ultimate conclusion will be transformed into ‘all for each’. The freedom of one will be the freedom of all. A community which is not built on the demands of individuals and their dialectic can only reinforce the oppressive violence of power. The Other in whom I do not find myself is nothing but a thing, and altruism leads me to the love of things, to the love of my isolation.
Seen from the viewpoint of altruism, or of solidarity, that altruism of the left, the sentiment of equality is standing on its head. What is it but the common anguish of associates who are lonely together, humiliated, fucked up, beaten, deprived, contented together, the anguish of unattached particles, hoping to be joined together, not in reality, but in a mystical union, any union, that of the Nation or that of the Labour Movement, it doesn’t matter which so long as it makes you feel like those drunken evenings when we’re all pals together? Equality in the great family of man reeks of the incense of religious mystification. You need a blocked-up nose to miss the stink.
For myself, I recognize no equality except that which my will to live according to my desires recognizes in the will to live of others. Revolutionary equality will be indivisibly individual and collective.

The perspective of power has only one horizon: death. And life goes to this well of despair so often that in the end it falls in and drowns. Wherever the fresh water of life stagnates, the features of the drowned man reflect the faces of the living: the positive, looked at closely, turns out to be negative, the young are already old and everything we are building is already a ruin. In the realm of despair, lucidity blinds just as much as falsehood. We die of not knowing, struck from behind. In addition, the knowledge of the death that awaits us only increases the torture and brings on the agony. The disease of attrition that checks, shackles, forbids our actions, eats us away more surely than a cancer, but nothing spreads the disease like the acute consciousness of this attrition. I remain convinced that nothing could save a man who was continually asked: have you noticed the hand that, with all die respect, is killing you? To evaluate the effect of each tiny persecution, to estimate neurologically the weight of each constraint, would be enough to flood the strongest individual with a single feeling, the feeling of total and terrible powerlessness. The maggots of constraint are spawned in the very depths of the mind; nothing human can resist them.
Sometimes I feel as if power is making me like itself: a great energy on the point of collapsing, a rage powerless to break out, a desire for wholeness suddenly petrified. An impotent order survives only by ensuring the impotence of its slaves: Franco and Batista demonstrated this fact with brio when they castrated captured revolutionaries. The regimes jokingly known as ‘democratic’ merely humanize castration. At first sight, to bring an old age prematurely seems less feudal than the use of the knife and ligature. But only at first sight: for as soon as a lucid mind has understood that impotence now strikes through the mind itself, we might as well pack up and go home.
There is a kind of understanding which is allowed by power because it serves its purposes. To borrow one’s lucidity from the light of power is to illuminate the darkness of despair, to feed truth on lies. Thus the aesthetic stage is defined: either death against power, or death in power: Arthur Cravan and Jacques Vaché on one side, the S.S, the mercenary and the hired killer on the other. For them death is a logical and natural end, the final confirmation of a permanent state of affairs, the last dot of a lifeline on which, in the end, nothing was written. Everyone who does not resist the almost universal attraction of power meets the same fate: the stupid and confused always, very often the intelligent too. The same rift is to be found in Drieu and Jacques Rigaux, but they came down on different sides: the impotence of the first was moulded in submission and servility, the revolt of the second smashed itself prematurely against the impossible. The despair of consciousness makes the murderers of Order, the consciousness of despair makes the murderers of Disorder. The fall back into conformity of the so-called anarchists of the right is caused by the same gravitational pull as the fall of damned archangels into the iron jaws of suffering. The rattles of counter-revolution echo through the vaults of despair.
Suffering is the pain of constraints. An atom of pure delight, no matter how small, will hold it at bay. To work on the side of delight and authentic festivity can hardly be distinguished from preparing for a general insurrection.
In our times, people are invited to take part in a gigantic hunt with myths and received ideas as quarry, but for safety’s sake they are sent without weapons, or, worse, with paper weapons of pure speculation, into the swamp of constraints where they finally stick. Perhaps we will get our first taste of delight by pushing the ideologists of demystification in front of us, so that we can see how they make out, and either take advantage of their exploits or advance over their bodies.
As Rosanov says, men are crushed under the wardrobe. Without lifting up the wardrobe it is impossible to deliver whole peoples from their endless and unbearable suffering. It is terrible that even one man should be crushed under such a weight: to want to breathe, and not to be able to. The wardrobe rests on everybody, and everyone gets his inalienable share of suffering. And everybody tries to lift up the wardrobe, but not with the same conviction, not with the same energy. A curious groaning civilization.
Thinkers ask themselves: “What? Men under the wardrobe? However did they get there?” All the same, they got there. And if someone comes along and proves in the name of objectivity that the burden can never be removed, each of his words adds to the weight of the wardrobe, that object which he means to describe with the universality of his ‘objective consciousness’. And the whole Christian spirit is there, fondling suffering like a good dog and handing out photographs of crushed but smiling men. “The rationality of the wardrobe is always the best”, proclaim the thousands of books published every day to be stacked in the wardrobe. And all the while everyone wants to breathe and no-one can breathe, and many say “We will breathe later”, and most do not die, because they are already dead.
It is now or never.

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